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Economic Analysis of Fertility in Israel
I.Introduction
I view, in this paper, cross-section evidence on fertility in Israel through
a very simple hypothesis based on the links among education, the cost of
time of women, and the full price of children. The hypothesis is useful
in explaining some aspects of behavior, but important facets of the varia-
tion in fertility remain unexplained.
In recent years there have been several attempts to bring the determi-
nation of family size within the scope of the economics of household
behavior (see Leibenstein 1957; Becker 1960; Mincer 1963; Easterlin
1968, 1969; Schultz 1969; and others).
An economic theory of fertility starts with the postulate that house-
holds maximize some utility function in which children and other goods
appear as arguments subject to resource constraints in which the prices
or the costs of production of the arguments appear. The effect of a change
in any variable on the number of children depends on the extent to which
it lifts the general resource constraint and induces an income effect and
the extent to which it changes relative prices and induces a substitution
effect. Recent developments in the theory of the household (particularly
by Becker [1965] and Lancaster [1966]) provide a unified framework
for handling various aspects of the fertility decision. However, in choosing
regression weighted by the
area regressions are useful,
but Gardner's specification
me that is confronted most
gates—is that of selective
I, for example, women who
and for having few children
better employment oppor-
tween female earnings (or
e partly spurious—at least
s in wages on the quantity
ne series. I suggest further
population is drawn, the
ince interarea mobility is
istical Areas (SMSAs), or
is better, I believe, than
(Worse still would be the
'ty.)
accepting the regression
unbiased. The income co-
problem, the
exclusions and fertility-
ppears biased down (too
eity problem, the "tastes"
We have no way of judg-
w of the empirical work is
consistent with the price
Yoram Ben-Porath
TheHebrew University, Falk Institute, and Harvard University
This paper is part of a research project at the Falk Institute of Economic Research,
Jerusalem, on the economic determinants of fertility. I acknowledge Avner Halevi's
very able research assistance. I benefited much from comments by Zvi Griliches as well
as conversations with Simon Kuznetz, H. Gregg Lewis, Jacob Mincer, M. Rothschild,
T. Paul Schultz, T. W. Schultz, Julian Simon, and many others. Communication with
several of the authors in this book was very helpful, and I owe much to Robert J. Willis
in particular. The Central Bureau of Statistics supplied data, and the Demographic
Center, the Prime Minister's Office, Jerusalem, partly financed this study. I wrote this
paper under National Science Foundation grant GS 2762X while visiting at Harvard.
None of those acknowledged probably wishes to be responsible for anything in this
paper.
189YORAM BEN-PORATH
a particular specification within this framework, one has to deal with a
number of variables that are not directly observable and on which mere
speculation could lead more than one way. Alexander Gerschenkron alluded
only to one of them when he commented that "in the case of a child the
act of shopping has felicific aspects not fully duplicated in buying a car
or a refrigerator" (1961, p. 1007).
The most difficult questions have to do with the basic motives for
having children, the substance of parent-child relationships in terms of
mutual responsibilities, and the associated costs and benefits (see Section
VI). The economist's contribution depends on his ability to explain the
phenomena in terms of changes in resources and scarcities and to go
beyond statements about "taste" differences. Even when one avoids the
speculative terrain, these considerations implicitly affect the choice of the
dependent variable in the fertility analysis—the "quantity of children
demanded." The expected number of surviving adults (or adult-years)
would be appropriate according to some motives, while expected child-
years or some other measure would be more appropriate under another
motive. In this study the choice offertility variables simply reflects
expediency.
An economist is also faced with the (somewhat less frustrating) ques-
tions arising because the actual number of children (or any other measure
of the quantity demanded) is not equal to what it would have been had
people been abletoachieve the exact quantity they wanted with
full certainty and without extra cost (I am avoiding the distinction be-
tween desired and undesired births)'. Uncertainties associated with the
health, virility, and fecundity of the parents, and with contraception and
the risks of infant and subsequent mortality, affect the demand for chil-
dren through their effects on costs and benefits in ways that depend on
the risk preferences of the parents.
Much of the economic treatment of fertility has been concerned with
the relation between income and fertility, largely in an attempt to dis-
cover the expected positive association behind the "mask" of the observed
negative association.' The emphasis in this paper is on the relation with
education. Education of parents is likely to be associated with every aspect
of the fertility model. It may affect not only the individual parent's pref-
erences for children and the relative importance of husband's and wife's
preferences in family decision making, but also parental productivity in
child rearing and in other activities; it may affect the ability to control
the number of births as well as reduce the incidence of child mortality.
In a dynamic context where households are faced with changes in condi-
tions, people with more education may perceive changes earlier, be able
1Inaddition to the studies already mentioned, see Adelman (1963), Freedman
(1963), and Simon (1969).
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optimum earlier than others.
Students of fertility are all aware of the complexity and the richness of
the phenomena.2 There are evidently more aspects and relevant considera-
tions than there are actually measurable variables. The choice of the divid-
ing line between things expressed explicitly in the hypothesis and things
relegated to the "residual" or to poststudy speculation isto a degree
arbitrary.
The advantage of the simple hypothesis I am using to view evidence in
this paper lies in its relative proximity to market phenomena: it minimizes
assertions about unobserved relationships. The questions are how far one
can go with such a simple tool, and where it fails, what one can learn from
this experiment about possible improvements.
After introducing the Israeli context briefly (Section II),' I present the
following hypothesis in Section III: the demand for children depends on
the full income of the household and the full prices of children and other
goods. Child rearing, compared with other goods, is intensive in the time
of the mother, and therefore the price of children relative to that for
other goods moves together with the price of time of women.
Education is assumed to be related to higher cost of time of women,
and therefore it is associated with a substitution effect against children.
Education is also associated with higher full income: if the substitution
effect dominates, one would expect a negative relation between fertility
and education of women. Because of the lesser role of men in child rearing,
the husband's education is expected to be associated less with such price
effects and, perhaps, more with household income.
The evidence (Section IV) shows the expected negative association be-
tween fertility and the education of women and an ambiguous relation
with the education of men.
A strange pattern emerges, however, in that the relation between fertility
and education is steep at the very low levels of education and tends to
flatten or even turn up at the top. Section V is devoted mostly to exploring
the fertility-education relation as a reflection of the initial hypothesis.
Examination of a more sophisticated version of this hypothesis suggested
by Willis (1971) does not answer the query posed by this shape of curve.
The relation among education of women, the wage rate, and labor supply
indicates that at the low levels of education, where the decline in fertility
is large, the differentials in labor supply are modest, while at the top edu-
cational categories, where differential fertility is modest, the differences in
labor supply are large. The possibility of large elasticity of substitution in
2 Roberto Bach!, Dov Friendlander, Judah Matras, Helmut Muhsam, Oscar Schmeltz,
and other Israeli demographers have studied various aspects of these questions. See
also a recent study by Peled (1969).
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child raising and some doubts as to the relative time-intensity assumptions
are discussed.
Thus, my impression is that. the simple cost-of-time hypothesis, while
consistent with some of the evidence, leaves some important aspects of the
fertility-education relation unexplained. This is not a statement about the
"validity" of the hypothesis, but rather one about its power or robustness
—Sits ability to account for a particular set of facts when other hypotheses
are "left out." This is a tentative statement based on limited data and
imperfect analysis. Future work will try to improve the analysis of this
hypothesis as well as to explore somewhat richer hypotheses (see Section
V)
I!The Context
t briefly review here some of the salient characteristics of the Israel case
and their implications for analysis of the cross-section data on fertility.
A somewhat broader backgroundIpresented elsewhere(Ben-Porath
1970a) included some tentative discussion of the time series and the Arab
population; the emphasis in this paper is on cross-section differences in
the Jewish population.
More than half of the Jews in Israel in 1970 were foreign born. More-
over, out of 1,789,000 adult Jews (15 years of age and older), 73 percent
were foreign born, and an additional 23 percent had foreign-born fathers
(Central Bureau of Statistics 1971, table B/20, pp. 46—47). There is great
diversity in place of origin. Slightly more than half of the foreign born in
1970 were natives of Europe and America (EA), mostly of Eastern
Europe, and the rest were born in Asia and Africa (AA), mostly in the
Arab countries of the Middle East and North Africa. The timing of immi-
gration differed for the two broad groups. As of 1970, about 32 percent
of the Europeans and Americans had come before 1948, and another 39
percent had arrived in the period 1948—54. Of the immigrants from Africa
and Asia only 7 percent came before 1948 and about 46 percent came in
1948—54. (The period 1948—51 is known as the period of mass immigra-
tion, when about half of all the 1948—70 immigrants arrived.) The EA
component of the population has had a longer average stay in the
country.
Both place of birth and recency of arrival show up very clearly in
fertility differentials (table 1). The AA women, consistent with the fertil-
ity levels of their countries of origin, have much higher levels of fertility
than the rest of the Jewish population. Over time, differentials have nar-
rowed—fertility of AA women has declined sharply, and that of the EA
group and those born in Israel (IS) showed some increase (among IS,
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TABLE 1
TOTAL FERTILITY OP JEWISH WOMEN IN ISRAEL BY CONTINENT OP BIRTH AND






1954 or before 4.69 4.09
1955—60
1961—64 6.15




Europe-America, all 2.35 2.78
Immigrated:
1954 or before 2.35 2.79
1955—60
1961—64 2.40




SOURCE—Central Bureau of Statistics 1971. table C/26, p. 82.
NoTE—Total fertilityisthe sum (unweighted) ofage-specificbirthfor women (all, not ortly
married) aged 15—49.
The cross-section differences by period of immigration reflect both "learn-
ing," or adjustment over time, and differences between periods in the
composition of immigration by specific countries of origin within each
continent.
The main challenge of the Israeli situation, to which this paper can
make only a slight contribution, is the understanding of the demographic
transition of those coming from less-developed countries of Asia and
Africa, together with the fertility behavior of Jews of European origin,
who came initially from a low-fertility background and who on the whole
had to make a somewhat less dramatic cultural adjustment.
III.The Wife's Cost of Time
The theory of the allocation of time (Becker 1965) suggests a framework
that can accommodate a variety of problems of household behavior. Con-
sider a simple model carved out of this framework which formalizes one
of the traditional explanations for the secular decline in fertility.3 Let:
C = services from children;
N = number of children;
Q=a constant;
S = real consumption level of parents;
This is the simplest common denominator of all current microeconomic models of




= the shadow price of commodity j;
P = price of market goods;
V = nonlabor income;
Education affects then I = full income;
= time input of individual i into one unit of commodity j;
pricesand on full inco
= total time input of individual i into commodity j; I ox3
iin the labor market; I =
= total time of individual 1;
= market goods input into one unit of commodity j; I Sothe effect of a change
= market goods input into commodity j; I
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ON ON
= wage rate of individual i; = OE,
= the share of the value of i's time in the full
price of commodity j; I
IIWVE
i= /,m, female, ma]e; L
j =N,S. where the starred
Parents are postulated to maximize a utility function: terms,
U*(C,S) = U*(QN,S) = U(N,S). (1)
This maximization is subject tothe constraints—production
1NEj
function for children and the consumption commodity:
Consider first the effect
N = XN), (2) intensive in the value o
S=/3(T18,Tm8,Xg). (3) (i.e., a,N—a,3>O) an
dren (iN!) is small, the
Resource constraints are: dren and education can
When men are consid
T.1N ++ Tja = i = /, m; (4)
are smaller than the
between them. On the o V+T,nLWm+TILW!=P(XN+XS). (5)
income through their ea
Let the production functions exhibit constant returns to scale;thus flxt is positive, there is
average and marginal input coefficients are equal. For internal solutions between the number of
of resource allocations (4) and (5), combine into Mincer's study (1963
the wage of women (di
(t,NW, + tmNWrn + PxN)N + (t,8W,.+ tm2Wrn + pX8)S (6)
knowledge, the first ex
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Maximization of utility (eq. [1]) involves equating rates of substitu-
tion in consumption to ratio of full prices (7) and adhering to the budget I IV.Evidence
constraint (6). i first summarize briefi
— Porath1970a, 1970b)
(7) fertility and education
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Education affects the number of children here through its effects on full
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iodity. Consider first the effect of women's education (E,). If children are more
(2) intensive in the value of the mother's time than the consumption good
(3)
(i.e., a1 N —> 0) and if the income elasticity of the number of chil-
dren issmall, then a negative relation between the number of chil-
dren and education can be expected.
(4) When men are considered, it is probably reasonable to assume that the
aresmaller than the a11 and one cannot say much about the difference
+ X ) (5) between them. On the other hand, men contribute relatively more to full
S income through their earnings so that if the income elasticity
Ltreturns to scale;thus is positive, there is greater ambiguity as to the sign of the relation
al. For internal solutions between the number of children and the education of the father.
Mincer's study (1963) of cross-section association between fertility and
(6) the wage of women (directly rather than through education) was, to my
knowledge, the first exposition and test of essentially this hypothesis, fol-
W,T, + WmTm + V =1. lowed by an unpublished paper by Cain and Weininger (1967).
uating rates of substitu-
d adhering to the budget IV.Evidence
I first summarize briefly some of the evidence presented elsewhere (Ben-
Porath 1970a, 1970b) relating to the cross-section association between
(7) fertility and education in aggregate data (that do not permit analysis of
the relation with income).
of education (8): The theoretical model presented above leads one to expect a larger nega-196 YORAM BEN-P0RATH
tive association between the education of wives and fertility than between
fertility and education of husbands. A two-way classification of wives by
their education and the education of their husbands bears this out. Holding
husband's education constant, one gets a clear negative relation between
number of children-ever-born and the education of a wife, but when the
latter is held constant, no clear relation emerges between fertility and
education of the husband.
Also, in cross-section regressions where the observations are mean values
for cities, towns, and villages, the median schooling of women has a larger
negative coefficient than that of men (the dependent variable is an age-
adjusted birth rate). See table 2.
A particularly interesting, albeit inconclusive, result emerges inthe
regression for kibbutzim. In such a communal social organization, where
there is no private budget constraint, where many of the child-raising
activities are centralized, and where allocation of women to work is not
tied strongly to their education, one would expect the economic mechanism
outlined earlier to be much weaker than in the usual case (of course, S
coupleswho contemplate leaving the kibbutz will take future conditions
into account). In fact, the regression for the kibbutzim was the only one
where the coefficient of education of women turned out to be positive, but
not significantly so. The very small range of variations in the median
years of schooling of women among the kibbutzim is responsible for the
inconclusiveness.This can be resolved by studying differences in fertility




Household data allow a more detailed evaluation of hypotheses and, in
the Israeli case, the inclusion of income in the analysis. A cross-section
analysis of a problem like ours certainly has many limitations. Individual
differences in tastes and abilities may generate the differences in fertility,
education, and income, so that the postulated dependence of the first on
the latter two cannot be reliably estimated, given the scarcity of truly
exogenous instruments to identify the system. (See Nerlove and Schultz
11970] for a brave attempt which illustrates the difficulties involved.)
The single cross-section is particularly inadequate in view of the long
span of time involved in the family-formation process. The focus here is
on explaining completed family size. Decisions are in fact made on individ-
ual children as part of a broader family plan, where the joint decision on
an actual child and tentative plans for future children are shaped by
presently observed values of the determining variables and expectations
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cided upon on the basis of more information, with actual income substi-
I tutingfor part of the previously expected values, while the rest of the
expectations are also revised. Cross-section data can give information on
completed family size of relatively older couples, but the corresponding
earnings or wage data are contemporaneous, realized values that may
deviate from the past expected values on the basis of which decisions
were made, and which were partly determined by them (e.g., women who
decided simultaneously to have children and forego schooling and the
learning experience in the labor market).
On the other hand, analysis of the cross section of couples at the prime
childbearing ages suffers from lack of information on completed fertility,
and issues of spacing are confounded with issues of completed family size
(data on expected number of children have not been widely analyzed by
economists). Longitudinal data could solve some of the problems and
would of course require a more sophisticated analysis.
Data
There is to my knowledge only one source of data that allows analysis of
fertility by education and income on an individual household basis in
Israel. This is the Family Expenditure Survey 1963/64 (Central Bureau
of Statistics 1966a) in which urban wage earners(in communities of
10,000 and over) were sampled, and women were asked, in addition to
the usual questionson consumption and income, about the total number
children born to them.
The set of observations that I work with has certain defects4 which I




The importance of the place of birth and period of immigration has al-
ready been stressed. These group differentials may be simply differences in
levels of fertility. More likely, they are differences in the coefficients of
the independent variables. Even if people were responding identically to
these "true" variables, it is plausible that the relation between measured
variables and the true variable which they approximate varies among
groups.
affects the analysis in several ways:
a) The sample is divided by place of marriage—those married in Israel
4 original material was on cards when we got it and was not entirely complete.
Also, the tape prepared for us did not include the weights of the individual observa-
dons, so the analysis gives equal weight to all individual observations. The survey is
described by the Central Bureau of Statistics (1966a).TABLE 3
MEANS AND STANDARD• DEVIATIONS OF VARIABLES USED IN REGREssIoNs—
FAMILY EXPENDITURE SURVEY 1963/64
MARRIED IN
MARRIEDABROAD ISRAEL (MIS)
ALL 11+ 15+ 11+ 15+
COUPLES Years* Years* Years* Years*
No.of households 1,217 455 437 354 201
No. of live births 2.55 3.28 3.29 2.70 2.75
SD (2.17) (2.74) (2.77) (1.77) (1.95)











SD (10.5) (9.3) (9.1) (6.8) (6.4)
Distribution by place of
birth and period of
immigration:
ISIS 0.03 ... ... 0.06 0.07
ISAA 0.03 ... ... 0.03 0.03
ISEA 0.05 ... ... 0.04 0.04
AA (1947 or before) ... 0.05 0.01 0.02 0.08 0.09
AA (1948—54) 0.21 0.22 0.22 0.11 0.00
AA (1955 or later).... 0.06 0.11 0.10 0.00 0.00
EA (1947 or before) ... 0.23 0.08 0.09 0.51 0.70
EA (1948—54) 0.25 0.37 0.37 0.17 0.07
EA (1955 or later)....
Total
Husband's monthly
0.09 0.21 0.20 0.00 0.00
1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
earnings (IL) 494.7 420.2 421.1 584.3 627.0
SD (274.2) (272.6) (281.0) (282.4) (305.1)
Distribution by years of
schooling of husband:
0 0,06 0,10 0.10 0.02 0.01
1—4 0.08 0,12 0.12 0.06 0.03
5—8 0.33 0.35 0.34 0.31 0.26
9—12 0.34 0.28 0.29 0.39 0.40
13+
Total
Distribution by years of
0.19 0,15 0.15 0.22 0.30
1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
schooling of wife:
0 0.12 0.18 0.18 0.08 0.07
1—4 0.08 0.10 0.10 0.08 0.04
5—8 0.35 .0.37 0.37 0.32 0.29
9—12 0.33 0.30 0.30 0.37 0.42
13+
Total
0.12 0.05 0.05 0.15 0.18
1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
NOTE—The notation for place of birth is: IS =Israel,AA =Asiaand Africa. and EA =Europe
and America. For those born in Israel, the second two letters indicate place of birth of fathers. In.
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(MIS) and those married abroad (MAB). Those married abroad could
have had some of their children born abroad, responding to different
conditions.5 Persons married in Israel presumably have had a more corn-
mon environment for family decision making. In comparing the two
groups, MIS and MAB, the following differences should be noted (table
3): Proportionately more members of the MIS sample are of European ori-
gin, with only a small fraction of the women born in Asia. They have also
immigrated earlier. They have lower fertility and are somewhat younger,
the husbands earn more, and both husbands and wives are better educated.
b)Withinthese place-of-marriage groups dummy variables are used to
allow for differences in fertility levels by place of birth and period of
immigration. Table 4 shows the following (the benchmark for the dummy
variables here is the European- and American-born who immigrated from
1948 to 1954):
Place of birth and period of immigration account for a large proportion
of the variance among both MAB and MIS, but more among MAB than
MIS. The AA group, particularly the recent immigrants (1955 and later),
has much higher fertility than the EA group. Differences are somewhat
narrower among MIS. The EA group shows small differentials by period
of immigration and has somewhat higher fertility than the Israeli-born.
c)Thesample is broken into two groups by origin—European and
oriental. The first group includes European-born (EA) and Israeli-born
with European-born fathers (ISEA), while oriental origin includes those
born in Asia and Africa (AA) and Israelis born to AA fathers (ISAA).
The few third-generation Israelis in the sample are left out here.
Years since Marriage and Age
The treatment of the marriage variables is somewhat problematic. Any
reasonable theory of marriage will have to state that the decision to marry
is at least partly derived from the demand for children. If this is true,
then the marriage variable (both as a criterion for dividing the sample
and as a variable in the regression) should not be used; if it is used, its
estimated coefficients are likely to be biased. In the Israeli population a
large fraction of those bOrn abroad went through the world war, migrated,
and endured various experiences that might have postponed marriage
independently of the demand for children. Thus for some groups the age
and length of marriage may indeed be an exogenous variable relevant to
the determination of the number of children. (Bumpass [1969] discusses
this issue differently.)
Most of the analysis was performed on subsamples of couples who were
married 11 or 15 years or more, with age and length of marriage as van-
In future work I hope to be able to follow a suggestion by H. Gregg Lewis to
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FERTILITY IN ISRAEL 203
ables in the regression. Some of the analysis was also performed on sub-
samples selected by age of wives (40 plus) without a length-of-marriage
variable. The "time" variables in the cross section capture, of course, not
only the stage in the life cycle but also differences among cohorts.
Education and Earnings—Additive Regressions
The origin and "time" variables enter the discussion mostly as controls.
Our main interest is in exploring the performance of parents' education
and earnings as variables.
According to the model presented earlier, husband's education is ex-
pected to be associated with weaker substitution effects and stronger
income effects than is wife's education (see eqq.[10], [11]). In the
regression for MAB the husband's education does not seem to play any
role. In the MIS sample men with no schooling report more children
than the rest, while the other differentials in fertility by male education
have no clear direction. When the European and oriental groups are ex-
amined separately (not shown), one can see among the oriental group a
vague (low t-values) U-shaped pattern, while among the European groups
the couples with a husband of little education have somewhat lower fertil-
ity than those with higher education.
Husband's current earnings are a difficult variable to interpret. We know
how crude a proxy they can be for permanent income. Where education
of husband is held constant, it can perhaps be argued that the remaining
variation in earnings has an important transitory element that is likely
to express deviations of actual earnings from the expectations that were
held at the beginning of married life. If these deviations are not a matter
of the given sample year but represent a persistent position, they could
affect the actual number of children. The coefficients here are negative
and often not distinguishable from zero (tables 4, 5). The source of the
negative association is the oriental group, both MIS and MAB, while
among couples of European origin there is practically no relationship.
The most interesting question has to do with the pattern of coefficients
of wife's schooling. Table 5 shows the following:
a) For the whole sample and for the two subsamples, MIS and MAB,
a similar pattern is observed: the "net" relation between fertility (number
of children-ever-born) and education of wife is mostly negative, with a
slight inflection at the top, suggesting a transpose-J shape. The sharpest
decline in fertility is between women with no schooling and women with
some schooling—a difference of 1.0—1.4 children.
b) Within the European group the relation between fertility and educa-
tion is much steeper and more statistically significant among MAB than
among MIS. Both share, however, the flattening at the top.





















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































NFERTILITY IN ISRAEL 205
increase in fertility at the top schooling category (both for MIS and
MAB). A clearer relation with education emerges in the MIS oriental
than in the MAB oriental.
In examining the evidence, one should recognize that there are very
few oriental women with thirteen or more years of schooling and European
women with zero years of schooling, so that one should not place much
confidence on the results for these categories.
Because of the possible biases arising from the role of the marriage
variable, I have also looked at a subsample selected by the age of wife
(40 plus, table 6). The number of observations is smaller and thus re-
stricts comparability. The general pattern of sharp decline in fertility at
the bottom of the education ladder and a flattening at the top shows up
also in this subsample. The relation is steeper among the oriental than
the European group. Contrary to the results reported in table 5, there is
no sharp upturn at the top educational category within the oriental group.
How plausible is it to regard the general pattern of education coefficients
as primarily a reflection of the hypothesis presented earlier?
V.Probing
The Interaction Model: Who is on Which Margin?
The fertility model developed by Willis (1971) focuses on one aspect of
the fertility decision that I have ignored so far. Willis's argument can be
paraphrased in the following way: the simple model presented earlier
TABLE 6
NUMBER OF CHILDREN-EVER-BORN TO WOMEN AGE 40+: COEFFICIENTS OF WIFE'S




































ISRAEL ABROAD ORIENTAL EUROPEAN
ALL (MIS) (MAR) (AA + ISAA)(EA + ISEA)
6 a 6 a 6 0 6 a 6 a
Constait
term 3.39 4.76 2.84 2.32 3.71 4.04 6.74 1.74 2.88 5.53
Wife's years of
schooling:
0 2.36 5.50 1.66 2.48 2.81 4.98 2.85 1.68 0.76 1.07
1—4 1.05 2.42 3.16 3.18 0.64 1.25 1.73 0.76 0.95 3.04
5—8 0.18 0.80—0.04—0.12 0.34 1.17 0.10 0.06 0.18 1.18














SEE 1.87 ...... 1.64... 1.95 3.53 ... 1.20 1.20
No. of
observations..497 ...182 ...315 ...100 ...389
N0TE.—Other
origin dummies.
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applies to households where the wife plans to work part of her lifetime
Only then is the market wage (or education as an indication of market
productivity) a correct measure of what she is foregoing by devoting time
to her children.0 Women who do not plan to work at all presumably have
a nonmarket valuation of their time higher than the market wage. Varia-
tions in the potential market wage for such women do not correspond to
variations (over individuals or over time) in the marginal value of time.
But higher full income of the household, by increasing the demands on
women's time in all household uses, raises the shadow price of this fixed
constraint and gives rise to a substitution effect away from children. There-
fore, one would expect husband's higher earnings to be associated with
higher probability of the wife being a permanent nonparticipant in the
labor force. Empirically Willis worked with an interaction model of the
form
Nb1W1 +b2W00+b3WiWm,b1 <0, b2?, b3 > 0. (12)




As shown in table 7, this model, which Willis has successfully applied
to U.S. data, also works quite well in the Israeli case. The coefficient of
the value of wife's education(i.e.,the average wage for the level of
schooling) comes out negative and significant; the coefficient of husband's
earnings, or alternatively husband's schooling, turns out to be negative
and significant but of smaller absolute value, and a positive and significant
interaction term emerges.
In interpreting the findings, one should distinguish between the esti-
mating equation, and the hypothesis behind it. The estimating equation
under the present conditions may be an expression of the same non-
linearities noted before. In our sample, and probably everywhere, there
is a positive association between wife's education and husband's education,
or earnings. The pattern depicted by the education-of-wife dummies could
have been captured by a parabola:
N=b'1W1+b'2Wm+b'3W12+.... (14)
The effect of wife's potential wage is:
= b'1 +21/3 W1,b'1 < 0, b'3 > o. (15)
t9W,
Michael and Lazear (1971) have recently argued that market wages of married
women do not correspond exactly to opportunity cost because of the foregone (net)
return to investment in human capital.
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7 As Robert Willis and Jacob Mincer indicated, if one starts by assuming linear
functions relating fertility to the relevant variables among working and nonworking
women and also relating the probability of work to the relevant variables, afull
quadratic results. One would assume that the resulting collinearity would make full
estimation impossible, but the suggestion is that the coefficients in eqq. (12) and (14)
should be interpreted as arising from an estimation where some relevant variables
were left out.
TABLE 7
INTERACTION MODEL: COUPLES MARRIED IN ISRAEL
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t market wages of married
cause of the foregone (net)
NOTI.—The regression is eq. (12) in the text: variables included and not reported here sre: age,
years since marriage, and dummies for place of birth and period of immigration. The number of
observations is in parentheses. Col. 2: the derivative of fertility with respect to one variable evaluated
at the mean of the other variable. Col. 3: elasticity of fertility with respect to wt evaluated at the
means (col. 4) using the partial derivatives of col.2. The mean number of children is 2.7. W, = an
estimate of monthly full.time earnings of women by education, using the following estimates of hourly
earnings by years of schooling—O: 1.28 IL; 1-4: 1.46 IL; 5—8: 1.70 IL; 9—12: 2.36 IL; 13+: 3.14
IL—and 172 monthly hours of (units: monthly IL). W,nearnings of husband
(units:1/10,000 monthly IL). R' = R' corrected for degreea of freedom. R*O = where
StWf,Nm, W(W,,,.
Ifthe correlation between Wes and W1 is positive and high (but not too
high), the interaction term W,,,W1 may be acting as a proxy for
One experiment along these lines is presented in table 8. Regression 2,
where W,2 appears, seems slightly more appealing than regression 1, with
W,'Wss; in regression 3, where both appear, the former drives the latter
out. No strong statement is called for, but it is not impossible that what
the interaction regression is capturing is mostly a curvilinear association
of fertility with the wife's education, which is independent of the (anyhow
questionable) effect of husband's earnings.7
Given the similarity between the phenomena, the question is whether
the hypothesis presented by Willis is the major quantitative determinant
of the empirical relation observed.
If we could classify women by their permanent work status and identify
the women who do not work in the market in the permanent sense, we
would expect no association withinthis group between fertility and208 YORAMBEN-PORATH
TABLE 8

































women's wages (or education). On the other hand, a negative relation
would be observed among those working part of the time. The actual work
status in the year of the survey is affected by many random factors and
also reacts differently at different times to the presence of children. Class-
ification by present work status is thus a poor substitute on many grounds
for the classification by permanent work status. Still, one would expect
the group of currently working women to be dominated by those who had
planned and expected to participate at least part of the time, while those
who are not currently working comprise those not participating because
of stage in the life cycle and random factors.
In table 9 the coefficients of wife's education for working and non-
working women are presented. The steep decline in fertility from 0 to 1—4
years of schooling is observed among both working and nonworking women.
Working women now show a monotonic decline of fertility by education,
while in the case of nonworking women the relation is of the transpose-J
shape. The upturn in fertility at top education levels among the nonwork-
ing has also been observed among orientals and disappears when a sample
of women 40 years of age and older is considered (not shown). What
remains with us is the sharp decline in fertility, between 0 and 1—4 years
of schooling, among both working and nonworking women; this, among
FERTILITY IN ISRAEL





variables in the regressions are: age, continent of birth, and period of immigration. See


























Nose—Other variables in the r
of birth, and period of immigration.
working MIS women, re
cation.8
The coefficients of h
hypothesis among MIS b
sions where husband's ed
On Labor Supply and th
As figure 1 shows, rougi,
indicate that, contrary
response of wages to schi
how labor supply is rela
The sample does not
women. Women are mer
8 Regression$ by Willis 0i
by education is concentrat
working and nonworking
big difference in. fertility b'
with less schooling. No sud
itYORAM BEN-PORATH FERTILITY IN ISRAEL 209




















rth, and period of immigration. See
and, a negative relation
he time. The actual work
iany random factors and
esence of children. Class-
)stitute on many grounds
-Still,one would expect
mated by those who had
of the time, while those
lot participating because
ifor working and non-
n fertility from 0 to 1—4
and nonworking women.
f fertility by education,
on is of the transpose-J
els among the nonwork-
sappears when a sample
ed (not shown). What
etween 0 and 1—4 years
ig women; this, among
A
TABLE 9
CoasFIclENTsOF WIFE'S EDTJCATION (DEVIATIONS FROM 9—12 op Scnoouiec)
ANDHUSBAND'S EARNINGS: WORKING AND NONWORKING WOMEN




















































No. of observations ... 183 626 99 255 84 371
NOTE—Other variables in the regressions are: age, years married, education of husband, continent
of birth, and period of immigration.
working MIS women, represents all of the variation in fertility by edu-
cation.8
The coefficients of husband's earnings are consistent with Willis's
hypothesis among MIS but not among MAB. (This is true also in regres-
sions where husband's education is not included.)
On Labor Supply and tile Demand for Domestic Help
As figure 1 shows, rough estimates of the hourly wage by education level
indicate that, contrary to the response offertility, the larger relative
response of wages to schooling is at the top education level. Let us examine
how labor supply is related to education.
The sample does not provide detailed information on the work status of
women. Women are merely classified as "working" and "nonworking," and
8 Regressions by Willis on U.S. data suggestalsothat the steep decline in fertility
by education isconcentrated at the bottom of the education scale, among both
working and nonworking women. At the top among working women thereisa
big differencefertility between women with S or more years of college and those
with less schooling. No such difference, however, emerges for nonworking women.210 YORAMBEN-PORATH .FERTILITYIN ISRAEL
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domestic help, by education of women. (Curves on the left-hand side refer toall
women married in Israel and married abroad. The coefficients are taken, going from top
to bottom, from tables 4, 6, and 9. Curves on the right-hand side are based on table
7 [note], and tables 10 and 12. The last two curves refer only to women married in
Israel [MIS].)
this binary variable is the dependent variable in the regressions in table 10.
The pattern of coefficients of wife's education is depicted in figure1.
It is quite different from what has been observed for fertility: the sharp
differences in the proportion working are at the top levels of education,
while there are no significant differences at the low levels (0, 1—4, 5—8
yearsof school).
This seems to be corroborated in a study of labor-force participation
of women in Israel based on another source of data, the 1956—57 Saving
Survey (Fishelsohn 1972)
In a regression where annual participation is the dependent variable, and age,
birthplace, and various income and employment characteristicsof husbands are
controlled, the following pattern of dummy coefficients for women's education earn-
ings emerges (each coefficient should read as the fraction of women who participated
at any time during the year):
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variable is of a binary na
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for fertility: the sharp
top levels of education,
low levels (0, 1—4, 5—8
Labor-forceparticipation
ita, the 1956—57 Saving
pendent variable, and age,
cteristicsof husbands are
r women's education earn-
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NoTE—All" includes ISIS. Dependent variable L =thebinary classification, work.nonwork; L is
the proportion working. The bases br the dummy variables are women with 9—12 years of schooling,
and women with no children less than 14 years old in the house.
These regressions ignore the problems that arise when the dependent
variable is of a binary nature (see Theil 1971, pp. 632—36). It is useful
to examine also the relative change in the odds of working (number of
working/number of nonworking) as education increases. When all couples
in the sample are classified by the presence of children aged 0—5 (table 11,
cols. 3, 4), we find that the relative increase in the odds of working with
education are appreciably larger at the top of the educational ladder than
at the bottom. (Husband's earnings are not held constant.)
LFPR*
1. Did not go to school 301
2.Elementary schooling incomplete 328
3.Elementary schooling complete 341
4.High school incomplete 405
5.High school complete 474
6.Higher education incomplete 641
7.Attending 656
8.Graduated 789
* Labor force participation rate.
I thank Dr. Fishelsohn for letting me quote his as yet unpublished results.The other piece of information that seems
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0—8 0.67 0.11 6.1
1.33 0.20 • 6.6
Constant
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NOTE—The dependent variable is
other activities. Again, the pattern of the coefficients seems to indicate
large differences at the top of the educational range—between 13 plus and
9—12, and between 9—12 and 5—8 years of schooling, and small differences
in the lower levels (table 12) ,10
Another question that bears on the subsequent discussion is: How is the
presence of children associated with work reduction by women? It is clear
in this sample (as was found in other studies) that it is the presence of
very young children (0—5yearsold) that matters. It is important also to
10 I have not checked here the effects of the constraint of zero expenditure, and in






















2.9 3.0 9.2 0.9
2.8 3.1 1.6
5.8





















Wife's years of schooling:














































SEE .34 .41 .17
V .16 .23 .38
No. of observations 737 450 249
:vant here is expenditures
rchased input is a close
th in child raising and in
icients seems to indicate
ge—between 13 plus and
and small differences
discussion is: How is the
n by women? It is clear
it is the presence of
-Itis important also to
of zero expenditure, and in
Nore.—The dependent variable is the monthly expenditure on domestic help in 100 IL.
know whether the "effect"(ignoring the simultaneity aspect)of the
presence of young children is larger among educated than noneducated
women. In ordinary least-squares (OLS) regressions with a binary work-
ing-nonworking variable, the "effect" is larger among educated women
(table 13); a similar result has been reported by others. Consider, how-
ever, figure 2. Let curve I be the density function of the shadow price of
time in nonmarket activities, assuming that this curve applies toall
women, irrespective of education. Let be the low wage rate of the
uneducated; the proportion of working women is the cumulative distribu-
tion up to WL; Wif is the wage of the educated, and the same applies. Let
the presence of young children shift the distribution of the shadow price
of time to the right to the same degree for educated and uneducated
women (II). The "effect" of the presence of children is the shaded area
in figure 2, up to WL for uneducated women and up to WH for educated
women. Thus, we observe a larger "effect" for educated than for unedu-
cated women, even though we have a case of equal shift in the shadow-
price-of -time curve. (Of course, if we let WH be much farther to the right,
this would not be the case.) If one wants to make inferences from partici-FERTILITY IN ISRAEL
that the relative effect of th
working is smaller among ii
An interesting difference
and European origin intI
presence of children limit
European women. This is
of table 13, column 3, but
Substitution in Production
Speculation about function
tion relation, together with
suggests a declining elasti
wage. Examine equation (1
of decline in the wage elast
of the income elasticity
Whatmakes this argumen
the size of the income elasi
Alternatively one can e:
on which the initial model
child raising than in other
of demand for children wi
cation) of women depends
tion and in production. Th
to the wife's wage rate is
where a11 is the share of
a is the elasticity of subst
of full expenditure on chi
elasticities of substitution
and purchased inputs. T
the a's and W. If a = 01
wages.
Consider a case where
a1s increases, the differe
reversed. Thus if the el
purchased inputs is hig]
12 This isa tentative exi
devoted to children, other
show something different. In
women of high socioeconOTTlt
SES women. Leibowitz (197
the same thing about educat
214 YORAM BEN-PORATH
TABLE 13
"EFFEcT" OF THE PRESENCE OF CHILDREN ON THE PERCENTAGE OF WOMEN WORKING,
BY SCHOOLING—COEFFICIENTS FROM OLS REGRESSION


























No. of observations 737 354 383
Oriental (AA + ISAA):


















No. of observations 249 186 63
European (EA + ISEA):


















No. of observations 450 149 301
NOTE.-—Other variables in the regressions are:age,(age)2, and total household expenditures on
consumption. The bases for the dummy variables are couples with no children below 14 years of age.
FIG. 2
pation data on differences in the effect of children on the value of time,'1
an explicit distribution has to be assumed; adopting the logic of the logit
model (with the underlying logistic distribution), itis more useful to
examine the ratio of odds-of-work status. In table 11, column 5, we see
ii Gronau (1973) has discussed the relation between participation and the value of
time.YORAM REN-PORATH FERTILITY IN ISRAEL 215









































idtotal household expenditures on
no children below14years ofage.
I on the value of time,1'
ng the logic of the logit
),itis more useful to
e 11, column 5, we see
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that the relative effect of the presence of children aged 0—5 on the odds of
working is smaller among the more educated."
An interesting difference emerges, however, between women of oriental
and European origin in this respect: educated oriental women let the
presence of children limit their labor-market activity much more than
European women. This is reflected not only in the regression coefficients
of table 13, column 3, but also in the odds in table 11.
Substitution in Production and Factor Intensity
Speculation about functional form is somewhat risky. The fertility-educa-
tion relation, together with what we know on the education-wage relation,
suggests a declining elasticity of fertility with respect to the woman's
wage. Examine equation (11) (after dividing through by 11wE):onesource
of decline in the wage elasticity of children with wages is the higher weight
of the income elasticity (iN!) with higher wage and employment of women.
What makes this argument weak is the uncertainty about the sign and
the size of the income elasticity.
Alternatively one can examine the substitution effect. The assumption
on which the initial model rests is a greater time intensity of mothers in
child raising than in other activities. The size of the compensated elasticity
of demand for children with respect to the wage rate (and therefore edu-
cation) of women depends on elasticities of substitution, both in consump-
tion and in production. The compensated elasticity of fertility with respect
to the wife's wage rate is
i*NW = i*N,rN (ajy —a,8)
= —a(1 —y) —a,8), (16)
where a,1 is the share of the value of wife's time in the full price of i,
o is the elasticity of substitution in the utility function, and y is the share
of full expenditure on children in full income Let Oy,be the
elasticities of substitution in production of N and S between wife's time
and purchased inputs. They determine the sign of the relation between
the a's and W. If a = = = 1, is independent of the level of
wages..
Consider a case where ar,> I and= 0; then declines with W,
a,s increases, the difference in factor intensities can narrow or even be
reversed. Thus if the elasticity of substitution between wife's time and
purchased inputs is high enough in child raising relative toall other
12 This is a tentative examination of this question. Time-budget data on time
devoted to children, other housework activities, and leisure, when analyzed, could
show something different. In a recent paper Hill and Stafford (1971) show that U.S.
women of high socioeconomic status spend more time with their children than do low-
SES women. Leibowitz (1974), using both labor force and time-budget data, shows
the same thing about education.216 YORAM BEN-PORATH
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activities, the relative time intensity of children diminishes as women's
cost of time rises, and factor intensity may even be reversed; correspond-
ingly, the curve relating fertility to education can flatten or even rise.
The observed relation could also be generated by other price differences
correlated with education and not explicitly accounted for.
In discussing labor supply, we noted at the top education levels a sharp
increase in labor supply, with a comparatively large wage differential, co-
existing with a modest or even "wrong" fertility differential, and a rela-
tively large increase in expenditure on domestic help. This allfits the
story of a relatively high elasticity of substitution in child raising.
We also noted that education and the presence of children interact dif-
ferently in affecting the labor supply where oriental and European couples
are concerned, the former constraining labor-force participation more than
the latter when small children are present. A priori speculation on the
differences in the ease with which time of mothers could be substituted
under these conditions could go both ways. Larger families in the oriental
group provide for flexibility in this respect. On the other hand, high
school—educated oriental women may regard the opportunities for substitu-
tion at a given level of quality as much more restricted.
This kind of speculation emphasizes the importance of some of the
properties of the initial model. The assumption that children are relatively
intensive in the time of the mother has not really been explored enough.
It is certainly true immediately after birth. Beyond that we observe large
variations in behavior. Many Israeli women who had worked steadily
before birth stay a few months at home, draw from the social security
service a large fraction of their usual pay, and then come back to their
steady job which the law has guaranteed for them, entrusting their baby
to the care of family or domestic help and later to a variety of child-care
services, often subsidized. The American situation seems to be different.
The Israeli institutional setup seems to involve less contradiction between
child raising and work of women, and was created partly because of a
pronatal bias.
If one considers subsequent stages in child raising, including expendi-
ture on education, the need for more -careful examination of the relative
time-intensity assumption is clear. Bringing in expenditure raises, however,
more than one problem and is discussed in the next section.
VI.Quality of Children and Parents—Issues for Future Work
Before concluding and summarizing, I am taking the liberty of speculating
a little more about one of the issues mentioned in the introduction. It is
not a direction dictated by the preceding analysis, but it is one challenging
and inviting possible extension of the analysis of fertility. Discussions of
the secular decline in fertility as well as of cross-section differences have
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ction differences have
often referred to the changing characteristics of children; the rising ex-
penditure, mainly on education; and the postponement of labor-force entry
of children. Large variations in these are evident in the Israeli data (Ben-
Porath 1970a). There is also growing evidence on a negative association
in the cross section between the number of siblings and various quality
dimensions. (Leibenstein [1971] has recently alerted economists to some
of these findings. See also Blau and Duncan 1967.)
Becker (1960), who introduced the analogy between various character-
istics of children and the quality of other goods, urged the need to recog-
nize the voluntary element in the determination of these characteristics;
and recent studies have incorporated a "quality" dimension into formal
fertility models (De Tray 1972b; Willis 1971).
The introduction of child characteristics (I hope we can find a substi-
tute for the word quality) as a decision variable into the utility function,
as well as the corresponding expansion of the production side, makes the
problem more dramatically underidentified, given the limited number of
truly exogenous variables around. The theory of the household still pro-
vides a useful organizing principle, but when specific models are carved
out of it by imposing enough restrictions, they need to be examined
simultaneously on several aspects of behavior and compared with alterna-
tives. Lancaster (1966) has suggested that we think of any observed good
as an input into some basic commodities. Preferences can be constant in
terms of the basic commodities, but the goods inputs may change. Chil-
dren and their various characteristics can also be viewed as such "goods"
servicing various "basic" parental needs.
One can think of several "motives" for having children, starting from
various psychological needs and ending with children as a source of old-age
security. Each of the motives may have a different income elasticity and
is affected by different sets of substitutes and complements. Presumably
the "quality" required for each of them may be different so that the
nature of the qualities and their relation to numbers varies. For certain
motives it is appealing to regard the number of children and some index
of quality as substitutes in the provision of "child services" (as suggested
by De .Tray [1972b]). Thus, if "quality" is future earning power of
children, then from the point of view of the old-age security motive,13
quality and numbers can be substitutes—two or three well-educated chil-
dren can provide the same future income that several uneducated children
would. I leave to introspection the judgment of how much substitution
there is between the number of children and their "quality" in serving
companionship or entertainment values.
These two examples have to do with cases where both the number and
characteristics of children serve what might be called egoistic motives.
But it must be clear that while the decision to have children may serve
An interesting study of this motive is in CaldweIl (1968).218 YORAM BEN-PORATH
one set of motives, their characteristics may be involved with another. In
particular, the characteristics of children may have to do with altruistic
motives: my utility function includes the number of children, my standard
of living, and what I take as a proper utility function for each of my
children (that is if they would have the sense to have my preferences).
While I have children for my sake, my utility depends on what I conceive
to be their long-term happiness, and I decide on their standard of living
while at home and on their schooling according to this consideration. What
is important here is the link that this creates between the parents' own
consumption level and education and those of their children. The link
does not necessarily take the form of perfect complementarity (Willis
1971); there may be some sensitivity to relative prices, but one can see
that there would be limits to the desired intergenerational inequalities to
income and opportunities, even without assuming taste dependence on
parents' education. In terms of this story, the decision between the num-
ber of children and their "quality" is inconceivable without reference to
the parents' standard of living. It is evident that postulating such a link
does not have to rest on arguments of social pressure (see the Becker
[1960] -Duesenberry [1960] -Okun [1960] discussion and the subsequent
paper by Blake [19681) coercing the rich to spend much on their children.
While such pressures may exist, they depend presumably on prevalence
of a desire by most rich persons to spend much on their children.
As indicated, the weight of different motives changes as income and
the relative costs of fulfilling them change. Every textbook in demography
mentions social security as a substitute for old-age security. Also, the
feeling of parents that they have an opportunity to affect their children's
future depends not only on the supply conditions of education but also
on the parents' evaluation of how the labor market works. How important,
for example, is social origin versus schooling?'4 This varies between markets
and among individuals, depending on their own experiences.
The other part of this question has to do with the production side. How
important is the jointness in production between the "standard of living"
of parents and children? To what extent can certain parents achieve
certain characteristics of children "costlessly"? This is where the hereditary
argument may affect family size (for a recent survey of the controversy,
see Scarr-Salapatek [1971]). To what extent can parents (necessarily
mothers?) with certain characteristics (IQ, schooling?) produce higher
"quality" children more efficiently?'5 Is this efficiency in terms more of
their time or of purchased inputs? These considerations open up many
possibilities. No wonder that one can find a set of assumptions to accom-
14 This point was made by Simon Kuznets.
Michael (1969)has examined implications of edlicationeffects on household
production both in general and with respect to fertility (1970). I have dealt with the
effects of human capital on further production of human capital (Ben-Porath 1970c).
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modate any facts. For example, one central set of facts is that the negative
relation between fertility and education of women tends to diminish,
disappear, or even reverse at the upper range of education or among
groups of higher social and economic position. Elsewhere, in looking at
aggregate Israeli census data by age, I have also noted a sharp decrease
of fertility differentials by education of women (Ben-Porath 1970a). The
consideration of the quality dimension can generate rationalization of these
facts. The ingredients of the arguments are the following:(1) Quality,
the desired "standard of living" of children while at home, and the stock
of their human capital are income-elastic. (2) In producing quality, the
educated and/or rich have a lower marginal cost for quality. If is




The grounds for this may be the following:(a) There may be some
joint production between parents' and children's standards of living, so
that parents as they raise their own standard of living can raise that of
their children at less cost than if they had to raise their children's standard
of living alone. (b) As suggested earlier, educated mothers (or parents!)
may be more efficient in producing human capital in their children. (c)The
importance of parents' time in the total cost of children may be low for
"high-quality" children.
These ingredients could be combined into the statement that at higher
levels of income the desired quality of children is such that the cost differ-
entials by education or income diminish or disappear. But of course equally
plausible ingredients could be combined to explain some other evidence.
VII.Conclusion
I have examined cross-section evidence on differential fertility in Israel,
focusing on the relation between education and fertility. The interpretation
of this relation as reflecting the relation between education and the cost
of women's time and the relation between cost of time and the "price" of
children is helpful in understanding some of the phenomena; what is left
unexplained is the large decline in fertility at the bottom of the education
ladder.
This sharp decline may be dominated by informational and cultural
differences concerning family planning, of the sort suggested by sociologists
(see, e.g., the evidence presented by Bachi and Matras [1962], Matras
and Auerbach [19621, and Peled [19691). Several pieces of evidence are
consistent with a view that most of the cross-section and time-series
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variation infertilityreflectsdifferential movement to a low levelof
fertility where the long-term optima do not vary much. (Thus, see the
very flat curve relating fertility to education among couples of European
origin married in Israel.)
Even if such a view were to be accepted, the need for explaining the
mechanisms of transition remains. The possibilities of the simple cost-of-
time hypothesis are far from exhausted in this paper: a more explicit
treatment of the cost of time (see Gronau's paper herein), a more satis-
factory treatment of husbands' lifetime or permanent income, and a fertility
variable that takes timing and survival into account are some of the. more
immediate needs. What seems to be quite important is a simultaneous
examination of several aspects of behavior.
In the specific Israeli context, I regard as the main challenge the under-
standing of the differentials between those born in Europe-America, Asia-
Al rica, and Israel and the linking of the cross section to the changes over
time. The unexplained differences between these groups are partly a result
of measurement problems of the economic variables. Better understanding
may involve following some suggestions made by Professor Lewis and,
beyond that, a study of the behavior over time of cohorts of immigrants.
In terms of further development of the hypothesis, I have suggested
that an adequate analysis of fertility declines and differentials has to be
more concerned than I have been here with the joint determination and
interdependence between the number of children and their quality (chiefly
their education) with a somewhat more explicit link with the theory of
investment in humans than has hitherto been made. One additional reason
why I think this is a useful direction is that it bridges the dichotomy
between economic determinants and economic consequences of population
change. Studying the economic corollaries of changes in fertility may turn
out to be quite important in understanding the interrelations of demo-
graphic and economic transition and understanding better those cases
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Most of what I have to say in comment on Professor Ben-Porath's paper
he would have said himself had he lengthened his paper by a few pages.
My remarks consist mainly of conjecture.
First, I consider the question of the "power" of the budget-restraint
or opportunity factors in the "new home economics" to explain fertility
differences in Israel's population. It is certainly true that, in his fertility
regressions across individual Jewish households, the budget-restraint fac-
tors (I include here everything except the birthplace, place of marriage,
and migration-period variables) do not explain much—about 20 percent
at most—of the total fertility variance. Yet mother's schooling, age, and
duration of marriage together with father's schooling and earnings not
only are imperfect proxies for the underlying wage, income, household-
productivity, and price-of-contraception variables embedded in the budget
restraint, but also the extent to which they are so differs, I conjecture, by
birthplace, migration date, place of marriage, and even the parents' school-
ing. The consequences are biased estimates of regression coefficients and, I
suspect, overestimation of the importance of the place-of-birth, place-of-
marriage, and migration-date variables, and underestimation of the im-
portance of the opportunity factors in explaining fertility differences.
But what can be done about these problems, especially without asking
for unavailable data? I have a hunch that the ratio of years of schooling
to the natural logarithm of wages for which schooling in one of its roles
is serving as a proxy is greater: (1) for immigrants who completed their
schooling before migrating to Israel than for native-born Israelis and for
immigrants who completed their schooling in Israel, partly because, I
think, that schooling is somewhat country-specific, especially, of course,
with respect to language; (2) for more recent than for earlier immigrants;
and (3) for immigrants who live in "settlements" chiefly populated by
immigrants of like origin than for others, especially settlements well out-
side of the urban centers. These differences, furthermore, may vary by
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place of origin, sex, age, and years of schooling. Checking these hunches,
of course, does require wage data, though not necessarily the presently
unavailable wage data by sex for individual households. In the absence of
the relevant wage data, these conjectures contain only the suggestion that
Ben-Porath include, in one way or another, among the independent vari-
ables in his household regressions the place of schooling and the place of
settlement in Israel. Of course, even though wages are unavailable by
household, if wage averages are available by years of schooling, sex, and
place of residence in Israel (and perhaps other relevant characteristics),
it would be useful to construct from these data an estimate of the wage
by sex for each household and to include these variables in the household-
fertility regressions.
Schooling quite possibly plays a significant second role in the budget
restraint, namely, as a proxy for the "price of contraception"; and here,
as in its wage role, its imperfections may be correlated with the amount
of schooling and the other independent variables. But here, too, is there
anything useful that can be done about it? I have only one suggestion.
Let me assume that a person's knowledge of contraceptive technique is,
say, a positively inclined linear function of both his schooling and the
average schooling of the communities in which he has lived. Data on
schooling by community, I assume from Ben-Porath's table 2, may be
available for Israel's communities. Similarly, at least rough estimates of
schooling might be available for the immigrants by country of origin. And,
of course, date of immigration is known. Thus I think that it is possible
to construct an estimate of the average schooling of the communities in
which each parent in the household has lived, for use as independent
variables.
I suspect that the errors in schooling in its third role as a proxy for
household productivity may be less importantly related to the independent
variables.
The power of the budget-restraint factors to explain fertility differences,
of course, depends on what differences are to be explained. In particular,
a little aggregation of households often helps, as Ben-Porath's regressions
in table 2 tend to confirm. In the first of the regressions, which is across
Jewish communities except the kibbutzim and which has only two inde-
pendent variables, the median schooling of men and the median schooling
of women, the coefficient of determination (R2) is 53 percent. Further-
more, the contribution of the budget-restraint factors to explaining time-
series variations in aggregate fertility of Israel's Jewish population, I
conjecture, will be considerably larger than it appears to be in the house-
hold cross-section regressions. I hope that when Ben-Porath has completed
his work on the latter, he will apply the results to the time-series data.
The central finding in his paper is the sharp decline in fertility with
additions in schooling at low levels of schooling of the mother, and the
I
COMMENT
much more modest decl
(Indeed, there is a sugg
to mother's schooling a
that fertility




variables, I would be





doubt that the sharp
because it is too
In his section on





to an income-effect expi
is ambiguous even thou
children embedded in




I would add that the
the mother's wage to i
will be accentuated if
between number of
unity. Then, as the






number and the pare
where Qischild qua
does, that in thisH. GREGG LEWIS ' COMMENT 223
Checking these hunches,
the presently
tholds. In the absence of
only the suggestion that
g the independent van-
ooling and the place of
ges are unavailable by
s of schooling, sex, and
elevant characteristics),
estimate of the wage
iables in the household-
Dnd role in the budget
and here,
with the amount
But here, too, is there
only one suggestion.
:raceptive technique is,
his schooling and the
has lived. Data on
ath's table 2, may be
ast rough estimates of
of origin. And,
bink that it is possible
of the communities in
r use as independent
d role as a proxy for




ions, which is across
h has only two inde-
the median schooling
53 percent. Further-
s to explaining time-
ewish population, I
s to be in the house-
orath has completed
time-series data.
line in fertility with
the mother, and the
much more modest declines from additional schooling at higher levels.
(Indeed, there is a suggestion that fertility may even be positively related
to mother's schooling at high levels of schooling.) I regard this finding
that fertility apparently is not linearly related to schooling of the mother
as important, in part because it may help to reconcile apparently divergent
findings from regressions in which wage, income, and/or schooling vari-
ables enter linearly. Furthermore, despite my earlier comments about the
danger of biased coefficient estimates resulting essentially from left-out
variables, I would be surprised if this result is seriously changed. More
work on the data, of course, may flatten the fertility-education curve
somewhat, possibly eliminate the suggestion of positive inclination at high
levels of schooling, and, I would hope, reduce some of the differences
between place-of-origin groups in their fertility-schooling curves. But I
doubt that the sharp drop at low schooling levels will disappear, simply
because it is too marked to be eliminated easily.
In his section on "Substitution in Production and Factor Intensity"
and also in the following section on "Quality of Children and Parents,"
Ben-Porath speculates about what lies behind or explains the shape of
the fertility-education or fertility-wage curve (and, related to it, the curve
of labor-force participation and wage and that of domestic services ex-
penditures and wage). He is disinclined, and so am I, to give much weight
to an income-effect explanation. The sign of the relevant income elasticity
is ambiguous even though the income elasticity of demand for number of
children embedded in the utility function is positive. He suggests that the
curve shape may be rationalized in part by factor-(time-)intensity
reversals accompanying increases of the mother's potential wage ifthe
elasticity of substitution in household production between mother's time
and purchased inputs is higher in child raising than in other activities.
I would add that the tendency of the elasticity of fertility with respect to
the mother's wage to increase algebraically as the mother's wage increases
will be accentuated if the elasticity of substitution in the utility function
between number of children and parents' standard of living is less than
unity. Then, as the mother's wage increases, the fraction of income allo-
cated to the parents' standard of living (1—y)will be positively corre-
lated with the time-intensity differencearx —arsi inhis equation (16).
Once the quality versus quantity distinction is made in the analysis of
fertility behavior, and I think that it should be, our degrees of freedom
to rationalize data expand rather substantially. I would put child quality
(per child)in the utility function(as Willis does) along with child
number and the parental "standard of living":
U_— U(N,Q,S),
where Qischild quality, and I would be willing to assume, as Ben-Porath
does, that in this utility function child quality has a high income elasticity224 H. GREGG LEWIS
relative to those for child quantity and the parents' "standard of living." Economicsof
Inthe budget restraint I would add at least one term on the expenditure
side of Ben-Porath's equation (6):
1=SflS+N11N+NQH,
where NUN consists of expenditures on children that do not depend on
their quality, such as contraception costs (which enter negatively) and
NQFI are expenditures that depend on both quality and quantity. (It can,
of course, be argued that there are still other expenditures on children, asanorias
aslong as there are any, that depend on child quality but not on number University of Washington and
of children.) Earlier in this volume, Gary Becker and I discussed some
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